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Article 5

Baker: Ten Questions: Responses of John S. Baker, Jr.

TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES OF JOHN S. BAKER, JR.t

2. Is the Justice Jackson concurrence in the Steel Seizure case really
that helpful in sorting out separation-of-powers questions? Combined
answer with: 10. What is the most important question in national
security law today?
Justice Jackson has confused the understanding of separation of
powers by viewing domestic and foreign affairs through the same prism.
His description of the relationship between Congress and the President
fairly well describes the preeminence of Congressional power in
domestic matters. The Constitution, however, reverses the relationship
between the political branches in foreign affairs and national defense by
structuring power so that the President has preeminence.
Although President Truman was waging war in Korea, he seized
steel plants inside the United States. In the Steel Seizure case, Justice
Black's opinion for the Court plainly and accurately applied the
separation-of-powers principle. The case simply reaffirmed that the
President must find his power either in a statute or the Constitution.
Without a supporting statute, President Truman could only claim to be
acting under his constitutional powers as Commander in Chief. Inside
the United States, which was outside the "theater of war," he remained
the Commander-in-Chief, but he could not act solely on those powers.
Until Rasul v. Bush, I the Court accepted that the Constitution
operated differently in foreign and military matters. First of all, the
Framers wrote against background distinctions between natural and
positive law. While far from denying natural law, the founding
generation knew that positive law was the product only of a sovereign.
Accordingly, outside the sovereign territory of states, only the law of
nature existed. Jurists differed on the explanation of the relationship
between the law of nature and the law of nations, which was said to
govern the relationships among states. It was undisputed, however, that
the law of nations did apply only as between sovereigns. Violations of
t Dale E. Bennett Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center.
B.A., University of Dallas; J.D., University of Michigan; Ph.D., University of London.
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the law of nations had to be resolved, if at all, by sovereigns themselves.
Long after the terms "natural law" and the "law of nature" fell from
favor, and the "law of nations" became "international law," it was still
undisputed that "real law" did not apply outside the territory of the
sovereign which enacted it. Under both the "natural law" and positivist
approaches, the President, as head of State, dealt with other sovereigns.
The source and scope of presidential power as projected outside the
United States was well stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.,2 a case which Justice Jackson viewed very narrowly.
[T]he very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise
an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the
applicable principles of the Constitution. 3
The view of the Presidency expressed in this quote was not a
twentieth century invention of supporters of an "imperial presidency."
The Federalist explained the Constitution's creation of a unitary,
energetic Executive as necessary to protect the nation.
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war
most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the
exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war, implies
the direction of the common strength: and the power of directing
and employing the common strength: forms an unusual
and
4
essential part in the definition of the executive authority.
Understanding and accepting this original constitutional structure of
separation of powers, which includes a unitary Executive created
especially to protect the nation in foreign affairs and war, is "the most
important question in national security law today."
5. Does Congress have the authority, if so inclined, to regulate
wiretaps for foreign intelligence purposes outside United States
territory?
The Constitution assigns powers without specification generally as
to the purpose of their use. Congress has the power "[t]o regulate5
Commerce with foreign Nations." Communication, like transportation,

2. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 320.
THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
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is "commerce." Telephone communication between the U.S. and foreign
nations is "Commerce with foreign Nations," and, therefore, Congress
has the power to regulate it if it chooses to do so. The disputes over
FISA concerns whether Congress has or has not regulated such wiretapping. Note that regulating wire-tapping of communications which
occur between two points outside the United States would fall neither
under Congress's power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, nor
under any other congressional power.
6. What is the next step for the majority of the detainees in
Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba?
Detainee lawyers, who have been providing vigorous representation
for their clients, have already taken and lost several "the next steps"
following Hamdan. They quickly lodged constitutional challenges to
Congress's Hamdan fix. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled
against all their challenesto the Military Commissions Act, 6 the Supreme
Court denied their petition for certiorari, 7 and then denied a petition for
an extension of time to file a petition for rehearing and for suspension of
order denying certiorari. 8 Their "next step" must be to exhaust their
administrative remedies as provided in the Military Commissions Act,
per the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Stevens.
Only if the Government unreasonably delays the proceedings or causes
some other ongoing injury" will they be able to seek earlier review by an
Article III court. After exhausting the administrative process, they can
go to the D.C. Circuit as provided in the Military Commissions Act and
thereafter petition the Supreme Court. Otherwise, detainee lawyers have
been lobbying the new majority on the Senate Judiciary Committee to
reverse Congress's removal of habeas jurisdiction over Guantanamo
detainees. Even if such a provision were passed by Congress, it would
be vetoed by the President.
7.

Between Hamdi and Hamdan, which decision is most significant?

Both Hamdi and Hamdan are bad decisions for reasons stated in the
dissents by Justice Scalia. Hamdi wrongly expanded presidential power
domestically, as approved by Congress. Hamdan wrongly limited the
President's constitutional powers to act outside the United States. For
reasons stated in the combined answer to questions two and ten, Hamdan
6. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
7. 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).
8. 2007 WL 1225368 (U.S.)
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has the greatest significance.
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